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CRIMINAL LAW-RETROACTIVE LAW OR PUNISHMENT FOR A 
NEW OFFENSE?-THE Ex POST FACTO IMPLICATIONS OF AMEND­
ING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING VIOLATIONS OF SU­
PERVISED RELEASE 
INTRODUCTION 
Supervised release was created under the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 19841 ("Act") as "a new form of post-imprisonment supervi­
sion."2 The Act authorizes a sentencing court to require a defend­
ailt to complete a term of supervised release after completing an 
actual prison sentence.3 If a court imposes a term of supervised 
release, it also establishes the conditions of that release.4 If a de­
fendant fails to abide by the mandated conditions, the court has 
several options, which include extending the term, modifying the 
conditions, or revoking supervised release and imposing another 
term of imprisonment.s 
Conflict among the United States courts of appeals has arisen 
in cases where statutes governing supervised release violations have 
been amended and then applied to defendants who committed their 
crimes before these new provisions came into existence. The first 
of these amendments had the effect of removing judicial discretion 
in certain supervised release violation cases by requiring courts to 
impose mandatory prison terms.6 The second amendment author­
ized courts to impose, after revoking a defendant's term of super­
vised release, a sentence consisting of both imprisonment as well as 
an additional term of supervised release.7 Because, under the for­
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3551-3673 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 1994». For a discussion and evaluation 
of the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984, see Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform 
Act of1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REv. 83 (1988). 
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b) (1995). 
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994). 
4. See id. § 3583(d). 
5. See id. § 3583(e). See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the supervised release 
system. 
6. See id. § 3583(g). See infra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
subsection (g). 
7. See id. § 3583(h). See infra note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
subsection (h). 
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mer versions of these provisions, violations of release might have 
resulted in lesser prison time or less time subject to supervision, 
these defendants argued that the application of the new provisions 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by altering 
past punishment.8 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the only court 
that did not find an ex post facto violation by reasoning that the 
amended provision in question provided punishment for a new of­
fense.9 The Sixth Circuit treated supervised release violations, for 
purposes of ex post facto analysis, as separate offenses from the 
crime for which the defendant was originally sentenced. In turn, 
the court considered the penalties imposed for supervised release 
violations as separate punishments, having no relation to the origi­
nal sentence.10 Every other federal circuit to address this issue has 
determined that punishment for supervised release violations was a 
part of the punishment for the original offense, and that the appli­
cation of the new statutory provisions to defendants who were sen­
8. U.S. CoNST. art I, § 9, d. 3. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed." Id. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
Supreme Court's analysis of potential ex post facto violations. 
9. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. O. 
2529 (1996); see also Hanley V. United States, No. 95-1992, 1996 WL 476404 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 20, 1996) (adhering to the reasoning in Reese). It should be noted that several 
courts of appeals have held that the application of subsection (h) does not constitute an 
ex post facto violation, reasoning that the application of this subsection to defendants 
who committed their crimes before that subsection's enactment did not have the effect 
of increasing the punishment for the original crime as required under the Supreme 
Court's ex post facto analysis. See, e.g., United States V. Brady, 88 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
1996) (holding that the application of subsection (h) did not change the legal conse­
quences of the defendant's original crime); United States V. St. John, 92 F.3d 761 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the imposition of subsection (h) does not disadvantage a 
defendant sentenced prior to that subsection's enactment); United States V. Sandoval, 
No. 95-1326, 1995 WL 656488 (1st Cir. Nov. 7, 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. O. 77 (1996) 
(finding no ex post facto violation because that circuit had already interpreted subsec­
tion (e)(3) to allow what subsection (h) articulates). See infra Part I.C for a discussion 
of the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis. Only the Court of Appeals for the Sev­
enth Circuit, in United States V. Beals, 87 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1996), held that the applica­
tion of subsection (h) constitutes an ex post facto violation. See infra notes 144-145 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Beals. 
This Note focuses on those decisions in which courts of appeals have confronted 
the retroactive nature of the amended statutory provisions governing supervised release 
violations under ex post facto analysis, which have primarily involved subsection (g). 
See infra note 99 for the definition of "retroactive." Because the Seventh Circuit in 
Beals addressed the issue of retroactivity, in the context of subsection (h), this Note 
incorporates the Seventh Circuit's reasoning into its analysis. The issues raised in the 
remaining subsection (h) decisions are outside the scope of this Note. 
10. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590 (stating that the defendant was returned to prison to 
serve time for the supervised release violation, not for the original criminal conduct). 
1997] FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 501 

tenced before the enactment of those provisions constituted an ex 
post facto violation.ll 
This Note considers the arguments that have emerged concern­
ing the ex post facto implications of applying amended supervised 
release statutory provisions to defendants sentenced before the en­
actment of those provisions. Part I discusses the Sentencing Re­
form Act of 1984 and the development of the supervised release 
system. It discusses the relevant statutory provisions concerning su­
pervised release and supervised release violations, along with the 
corresponding policy statements issued by the United States Sen­
tencing Commission. In addition, Part I introduces the United 
States Supreme Court's analytical framework for examining possi­
ble ex post facto violations. It also presents the two lines of ex post 
facto cases that have served as the basis for the courts of appeals' 
holdings on this issue. 
Part II presents the two conflicting arguments that have 
emerged in the courts of appeals concerning the ex post facto impli­
cations that have arisen as a result of applying the amended super­
vised release provisions. Part III questions the soundness of the 
arguments asserted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
This Note concludes by suggesting that the Sixth Circuit's reasoning 
lacks the validity to justify its unique decision. 
I. . BACKGROUND 
The analysis of this issue begins with a brief look at the super­
vised release system and how this system was developed as part of 
sentencing reform. This section provides an overview of sentencing 
reform as well as a discussion of the principal features of supervised 
11. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 860 (stating that the government only punishes the con­
duct constituting the supervised release violation because of the defendant's original 
offense); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that amend­
ments which alter the consequences of supervised release violations alter an integral 
part of the punishment for the original offense); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 
881 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[f]or revocation purposes, the conduct [upon which 
revocation is based] simply triggers the execution of the conditions of the original sen­
tence"); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
alteration of supervised release punishment constitutes a "post hoc alteration of the 
punishment for an earlier offense") (quoting Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 306-07 
(4th Cir. 1989»; see also United States v. Flora, 810 F. Supp. 841, 843 (W.D. Ky. 1993) 
(treating revocation of supervised release "as the legal consequence of a defendant's 
original offense, rather than the sole consequence of acts committed while on super­
vised release"). 
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release. It also discusses the case law used by the courts of appeals 
to resolve the ex post facto issue. 
A. 	 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing 
Commission and the Advent of Supervised Release 
When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,12 
its purpose was to remedy the inadequacies of the existing federal 
sentencing systemP Before the Act, the system was based primar­
ily on a "rehabilitation model," where the Parole Commission's 
method of determining which prisoners were "rehabilitated" led to 
disparate results.14 Under that system, Congress would enact crimi­
nal statutes, sentencing judges· would then de.termine what 
sentences to impose within the permissible statut0I"Y,' range, and the 
Parole Commission would subsequently determine the actual 
length of the defendant's sentence. IS Because sentencing laws pro­
vided little guidance, federal sentencing judges were "left to apply 
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 u.s.c. 
§§ 3551-3673 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994». The Sentencing Refonn Act is a 
chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 
98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.c. and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994». 
13. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3221-22 (outlining what the Senate Judiciary Committee considered to be the principal 
problems with the federal sentencing system as it existed at the time). In refonning the 
sentencing system, Congress had three basic objectives: (1) to establish a fair and effec­
tive system through honest sentencing; (2) to seek reasonable unifonnity in sentencing 
by narrowing the disparity in sentences for similar crimes; and (3) to establish a propor­
tionate sentencing system that imposes appropriate sentences based on the severity of 
the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1995). For a 
discussion of the history of sentencing refonn and the enactment of the guidelines, see 
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993); Weigel, 
supra note 1; Todd L. Newton, Note, Commentary that Binds: The Increased Power of 
the United States Sentencing Commission in Light ofStinson v. United States, I I 3 S. CL 
1913 (1993), 17 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L.J. 155 (1994); see also Mistretta v. United 
States,488 U.S. 361,363-70 (1989). 
14. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. Under 
this "rehabilitation model," sentencing judges would typically impose long prison tenns, 
allowing for parole eligibility after the prisoner had served one-third of the tenn. The 
Parole Commission would bear the responsibility of setting a release date upon a deter­
mination that the prisoner had been rehabilitated. See id. at 40, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223. 
The Supreme Court has stated that "the rationale behind parole was that it was 
actually possible to rehabilitate the offender, thus reducing the likelihood that he or she 
would revert to criminal activity upon returning to society." Newton, supra note 13, at 
160-61 n.54 (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363). 
15. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365; Newton, supra note 13, at 160. 
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[their] own notions of the purposes of sentencing. "16 This resulted 
in a wide range of sentences for defendants who had committed 
very similar crimes, and was identified by Congress as a primary 
justification for changing the systemPWithout a structured sen­
tencing system, Congress believed that judges were left with "unfet­
tered discretion" in determining the length of sentences, while the 
Parole Commission was left to decide to what extent, if any, a pe­
riod of incarceration had rehabilitated the prisoner.18 
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act in an effort to 
formulate a comprehensive statement of federal sentencing law that 
would provide the desired consistency.19 The Act eliminated pa­
role, as well as the United States Parole Commission,2° and created 
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Colnmis­
sion").21 The Sentencing Conimission is' an independent agency in 
the judicial branch composed of seven voting members, appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and one 
non-voting member.22 The primary duties of the Sentencing Com­
mission are to establish sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines")23 and 
policy statements24 "that will further the basic purposes of criminal 
16. S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. 
17. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. 
18. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223. 
19. See id. at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. 
20. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake 
of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion ofSentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 
1689 (1992); Newton, supra note 13, at 162. 
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). 
22. See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL; ch. 1, pt. A(l) (1995). The 
President appoints each of the voting members after consultation with judges, prosecu­
tors, defense attorneys, and other parties interested in the criminal justice process. See 
28 U.S.C. § 994(a). The constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission was confirmed 
against separation of powers attack in Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). For a discussion 
of the Mistretta decision, see Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Author­
ity, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 
DEPAUL L. REv. 299 (1989); Lisa G. Esayian, Note, Separation ofPowers-The Federal 
Sentencing Commission: Unconstitutional Delegation and Threat to JudiciIJl ImpartiIJl­
ity? Mistretta v. United States, 80 J. CJuM. L. & CRIMINOWGY 944 (1990); Charles R. 
Eskridge, III, Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act After 
Mistretta v. United States, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 683 (1990); Laura Leigh Taylor & J. Rich­
ard Neville, Note, Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989): Upholding the Con­
stitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1429 (1989); Kristin L. 
Tnnm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be the Legislator": Dismantling Separation of 
Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 
(1989),65 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1990). 
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(I). 
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). In Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992), 
the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of policy statements "is limited to interpret­
504 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:499 
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and reha­
bilitation."25 Congress believed that the establishment of the Com­
mission and the promulgation of Guidelines would provide the 
necessary structure needed to ensure fair and consistent 
sentencing.26 
ing and explaining how to apply the Guidelines, and ... 'provid[ing] guidance in assess­
ing the reasonableness of any departure from the guidelines.''' Id. at 212 (quoting U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IB1.7). Additionally, in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 
36 (1993), the Court held that the Sentencing Commission's commentary to the guide­
lines is authoritative and therefore must be followed by federal courts "unless it violates 
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous read­
ing of, [a] Guideline." Id. at 38. Thus, as a result of the holdings in both Williams and 
Stinson, both the commentary to the Guidelines and the policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission, at least those which "interpret" Guideline provisions, are 
equally binding on the courts. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Stinson, see generally Newton, supra note 13. 
In addressing the policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual concerning violations of probation and supervised release, courts of 
appeals have reasoned that because these statements do not interpret guidelines, they 
are merely advisory in nature. These courts have often cited the language used by the 
Sentencing Commission in Chapter 7 to justify their decisions: "These policy statements 
will provide guidance while allowing for the identification of any substantive or proce­
dural issues that require further review." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 
7, pt. A(l) (1995) (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225 (3d 
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 773 (1997); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Caves, 73 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. West, 59 
F.3d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 486 (1995); United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638 
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mi­
lano, 32 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 
1994); United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Levi, 2 F.3d 
842 (8th Cir. 1993). 
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1995). The Guide­
lines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission are based on a classification system 
whereby every offense is categorized and graded based on its relative seriousness. See, 
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Al.1-2A1.5(1995) (outlining various 
forms of homicide); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (outlining the duties of the Sentencing 
Commission). The Guidelines are designed to provide judges with sentencing ranges, 
which are determined by the corresponding category of the offense. See S. REp. No. 98­
225, at 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234. 
26. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. 
Although the Sentencing Reform Act was designed to end sentencing disparity, com­
mentators have questioned whether the Act actually achieved that goal. See, e.g., Al­
bert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991); Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating 
Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Real­
ity of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1991); 
Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681 
(1992). 
For more general discussions of and views on the Sentencing Commission and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988); Freed, supra 
note 20; Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
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Under the Guidelines system, Congress intended for sentenc­
ing courts to retain some discretion in imposing sentences.27 Pres­
ervation of discretion is consistent with a primary goal of the Act­
to allow sentencing judges to address the needs of individual of­
fenders.28 Accordingly, sentencing courts can consider the circum­
stances surrounding each particular case in detennining the 
appropriate sentence.29 
The supervised release system, created under the Act, evi­
dences an attempt by Congress to preserve the sentencing judge's 
Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 
393 (1991); Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor's New Clothes: Due Process Considera­
tions Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REv. 467 (1993); Paul H. 
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1987); W. 
Crews Lou, Note, Balancing Burdens of Proof and Relevant CondUCt" At What Point is 
Due Process Violated, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 877 (1993); Lisa M. Rebello, Note, Sentenc­
ing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Five Years of "Guided Discretion", 26 SUF· 
FOLK U. L. REv. 1031 (1992); Jonathan Sharif, Comment, Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Due Process Denied, 33 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 1049 (1989); Robert H. Smith, 
Note, Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Should a Mitigating or Aggra­
vating Circumstance Be Deemed "Adequately Considered" Through "Negative Implica­
tion?", 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 265 (1994). 
27. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. Con­
gress stated that sentencing reform legislation "should assure the availability of a full 
range of sentencing options from which to select the most appropriate sentence in a 
particular case." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. 
28. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222. 
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) (outlining the factors courts must consider in 
imposing a sentence); id. at § 3553(b) (stating that a sentencing court may deviate from 
established guideline ranges when it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of 
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com­
mission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described"); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3234-35. If the sentencing court elects to depart from the Guidelines, however, it must 
state its reasons for doing so, and an appellate court may subsequently review the rea­
sonableness of this departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANuAL, ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1995). For discussions of the issue of departure as well as the 
standard of review under the Sentencing Guidelines, see Michael S. Gelacak et al., De­
partures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential 
Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1996); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Exami­
nation of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1991); Smith, supra note 26. 
For discussions of the issue of judicial discretion, or lack thereof, under the Sen­
tencing Guidelines, see Freed, supra note 20; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing 
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CIuM. L. & CRlMINOLOGY 883 
(1990); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 MARv. L. REv. 1938 (1988); Janet Alberghini, Comment, 
Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices for the New Federal 
Sentencing Commission, 35 CA'm. U. L. REv. 181 (1985); Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestab­
lishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109 (1992). 
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discretion.30 A form of post-imprisonment supervision, supervised 
release replaced the traditional parole system, which Congress 
viewed as a primary contributor to the inadequate state of the sen­
tencing process in the pre-Act period.31 Unlike a term of parole, 
which served to replace a remaining portion of a defendant's prison 
sentence, supervised release is imposed at the time of initi~ sen­
tencing as part of the sentence itself.32 Supervised release does not 
end a term of imprisonment prematurely, but rather follows a com­
pleted term of imprisonment.33 . 
A term of supervised release is similar to a term of probation. 
Both are systems in which a defendant serves a sentence outside of 
prison, subject to specified conditions.34 The principal difference 
between the two systems is that instead of following a term of im­
prisonment, probation serves as a sentence in and of itself, and is 
used as an alternative to incarceration.35 The primary goal of su­
30. For a detailed summary of the supervised release system, see Harold Baer, Jr., 
The Alpha & Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REv. 267 (1996). 
31. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38-39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221-22; 
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. I, pt. A(3) (1995) (stating that the 
reason for abolishing parole was to assure honesty and fairness in sentencing, as "the 
sentence imposed by the court [would be] the sentence the offender [would] serve"); 
see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacies of the 
federal sentencing system prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.. 
32. See 1~ U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994). Under the parole system, a defendant was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of being released on some date 
before the end of the term. Subsequently, the Parole Commission would make a deter­
mination as to whether the prisoner could be released and allowed to serve the remain­
ing portion of the sentence on parole supervision. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, 
reprinted in 1984·U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221. In making this determination, the Parole Com­
mission was allowed to consider a wide variety of variables, which included the history 
and characteristics of the prisoner, as well as reports from any and all sources. See ill. at 
38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3221, n.6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4206, 4207 (1982) 
(repealed 1984». This wide discretion was the source of the disparate release dates that 
Congress set out to eliminate. See ill. at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3221. 
33. See ill.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b) 
(1995). 
34. See generally 18 U.S.c. §§ 3563, 3583 (1994); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES 
MANUAL, ch. 5, pts. B, D (1995). 
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. B, introductory com­
mentary (1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3) (1994) (stating that probation may not be or­
dered if a term of imprisonment is imposed for the same or a different offense); Baer, 
supra note 30, at 269. The Guidelines authorize the sentencing court to impose a term 
of probation in place of imprisonment provided that it complies with statutory restric­
tions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5B1.1. Con­
ditions for probation and penalties for violations of those conditions are treated in the 
same manner as supervised release by the Sentencing Commission. See U.S. SENTENC. 
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 7, §§ 5B1.4, 5D1.3 (1995) (governing conditions and via­
·Iations of probation and supervised release); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d) (1994). 
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pervised release is to ease a defendant's transition into the commu­
nity after serving a term of imprisonment.36 
Supervised release was developed by Congress as a method of 
tailoring sentences to the needs of particular defendants because it 
permits the court to evaluate whether, and to what extent, a de­
fendant needs post-imprisonment supervision.37 Unless the imposi­
tion of a term of supervised release has been deemed mandatory by 
statute, courts consider a variety of factors in determining a defend­
ant's need for supervised release after imprisonment.38 Addition­
ally, while the maximum lengths of supervised release terms are 
dependent upon the classification of the defendant's offense, courts 
have the authority to determine the specific length as long as it falls 
within the permissible statutory range.39 
Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not distinguish between su­
pervised release and probation for the purposes of revocation procedures. See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32.1. 
36. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 124, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307. 
37. See id. at 123, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3306. A court may impose a 
term of supervised release to follow any sentence of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3583(a). However, a court is required to order a term of supervised release to follow 
imprisonment if required to do so by statute or if the defendant has been convicted for 
the first time of a domestic violence crime. See id. A court is also required to impose a 
term of supervised release when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is 
imposed. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL, § 501.1(a) (1995). However, a 
court may depart from the Guidelines' requirement as long as it provides reasons for its 
departure and imposes a reasonable sentence. See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b), (c)(2) (1994). 
The Sentencing Guidelines also allow a court to depart if it determines that a term of 
supervised release is not required by statute or is not necessary for the following rea­
sons: (1) to protect the public welfare; (2) to enforce a financial condition; (3) to pro­
vide drug or alcohol treatment or testing; (4) to assist the reintegration of the defendant 
into the community; or (5) to accomplish any other sentencing purpose authorized by 
statute. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § SOU, commentary (1995). 
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) (providing the factors that a court is required 
to consider in determining whether to impose a term of supervised release). For exam­
ple, courts are required to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to pro­
vide adequate deterrence, public protection, and to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; as well 
as any applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 
that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. See id. 
39. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(b) (1994) (providing the authorized terms of supervised 
release). These terms include: up to five years for a Class A or B felony, up to three 
years for a Class C or 0 felony, and up to one year for a Class E felony or for a 
misdemeanor other than a petty offense. See id. Offenses are classified in 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3559. Additionally, unless otherwise required by statute, the Guidelines require a 
court to include a term of supervised release of three to five years for a Class A or B 
felony; two to three years for a Class C or 0 felony; and one year for a Class E felony or 
a Class A misdemeanor. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5D1.2(a) 
(1995). A court may depart from the Guideline ranges, but the term of supervised 
508 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:499 
Terms of supervised release are accompanied by conditions 
which govern a defendant's conduct while on release.40 For exam­
ple, courts must require that the defendant not commit another 
crime and not possess a controlled substance during the term of 
supervision.41 Courts can also impose additional conditions pro­
vided that these conditions conform to statutory requirements.42 
After ordering a term of supervised release, courts have the author­
ity to terminate, extend, or modify the conditions depending upon 
the defendant's subsequent conduct.43 
B. Violations of Supervised Release 
1. The Statutory Provisions 
In addressing violations of supervised release, courts issue a 
warrant for the arrest of the defendant.44 A preliminary hearing is 
release imposed may not exceed the maximum terms stated in 18 u.s.c. § 3583(b). See 
Baer, supra note 30, at 275. 
In determining the length of the term of supervised release, a court is required to 
consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(c); see also 
supra note 38 (discussing these factors). A court may include a term of supervised 
release in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment. See Baer, supra 
note 30, at 275 n.52. 
40. See generally 18 U.S.c. § 3583(d). When a defendant pleads guilty to an of­
fense, courts must explain to the defendant, in open court, the "effects" of a term of 
supervised release. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(c)(I); see also Baer, supra note 30, at 283­
85 for a discussion of these procedural requirements as well as the consequences of a 
court's failure to adhere. 
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
42. See id. In determining the conditions of supervised release, a court is re­
quired to consider the factors provided in § 3553(a). See § 3583(c); see also supra note 
38 (discussing these factors); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, § 5D1.3(b) 
(1995). In addition, a court may incorporate any of the conditions recommended as 
conditions for probation under § 3563(b) as well as any other condition the court deems 
necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
The Sentencing Commission has also issued policy statements which provide a list 
of recommended conditions of supervised release and probation. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDEUNES MANUAL, § 5B1.4 (1995). The reasonableness of the conditions imposed 
by the court may be reviewed by an appellate court in a similar manner to appellate 
review of departures from the Guidelines in sentencing, discussed supra note 29. See 
also id. ch. 1, pt. A(2); Baer, supra note 30, at 276-82 (discussing issues surrounding 
conditions of supervised release). 
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(I)-(2). A court may terminate a term of supervised 
release at any time after one year based on the defendant's conduct. See id. 
§ 3583(e)(I). A court may extend the term of release up to the maximum term that 
could have been imposed for the defendant's offense. See id. § 3583(e)(2). It may also 
"modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release" provided that the 
court adhere to Rule 32.1(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. 
44. See 18 U.S.c. § 3606 (1994). This statute reads that the defendant must be 
"taken without unnecessary delay before the court having jurisdiction over him." Id. 
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then conducted to determine whether there is probable cause to 
hold the defendant for a revocation hearing.45 If probable cause is 
not established, the court must dismiss the defendant.46 On the 
other hand, if probable cause is established, the defendant is held 
for a revocation hearing.47 
At a revocation hearing, defendants are afforded more rights 
than at the preliminary hearing.48 However, a revocation hearing is 
not a formal tria1.49 For example, defendants are not entitled to a 
jury nor are they protected against self-incrimination.50 Courts 
have been rehictant to require these procedural protections in revo­
45. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a). Congress has incorporated the due process re­
quirements of a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing, established by the 
Supreme Court in parole and probation violation cases, into Rule 32.1 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Baer, supra note 30, at 285 (citing Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1972); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 advisory committee's notes (1979 addition». 
If arrested for violating a condition of supervised release, a defendant must be 
given: 
(A) notice of the preliminary hearing its purpose and of the alleged violation; 
(B) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence in the per­
son's own behalf; (C) upon request, the opportunity to question witnesses 
against the person unless, for good cause, the federal magistrate decides that 
justice does not require the appearance of witnesses; and (0) notice of the 
person's right to be represented by counsel. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1)(A)-(D); see also Baer, supra note 30, at 286. 
46. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1). The revocation hearing, as its name suggests, 
establishes whether a defendant has violated the conditions of release and whether the 
term of release should be revoked. See Baer, supra note 30, at 287 (citing FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2) advisory committee's notes (1979 addition». 
47. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1)-(2). Initially, when the supervised release 
system was first proposed and developed, revocation was not intended to be a conse­
quence of violating conditions of release. Rather, modification of conditions was seen 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee as the appropriate course of action. See S. REp. No. 
98-225, at 125 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3308. The Committee stated 
that defendants who had violated conditions of their release could be held "in contempt 
of court." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308. Additionally, the Committee 
stated that "[it] did not provide for revocation proceedings for [a] violation of a condi­
tion of supervised release because it [did] not believe that a minor violation ... should 
result in resentencing of the defendant and because it beJieve[d] that a more serious 
violation should be dealt with as a new offense." Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3308. 
48. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2)(A)-(E). For example, "(1) the notice of the 
alleged violation must be written; (2) the evidence against the defendant must be dis­
closed; and (3) the defendant need not specifically request the opportunity to question 
adverse witnesses." Baer, supra note 30, at 287 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2)(A)­
(E». 
49. See Baer, supra note 30 at 287. 
50. See iii. at 287-88 (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786). "Although a revocation 
proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal 
proceeding." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,435 n.7 (1984). 
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cation hearings because these hearings have not been considered 
criminal prosecutions.51 Nonetheless, as opposed to a probation 
revocation hearing, in which "a court need only be 'reasonably sat­
isfied' that a probationer has not met the conditions of proba­
tion,"52 the burden of proof at a supervised release revocation 
hearing is a preponderance of the evidence. 53 
In determining whether to revoke a defendant's term of super­
vised release, courts are required to consider the factors stated in 18 
U.S.c. § 3553(a) as well as the Guidelines and policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission. 54 If a court decides that rev­
ocation is necessary, it has the authority to sentence the defendant 
to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release that was 
allowed under the statute for the offense that initially resulted in 
the term of supervised release.55 However, in determining the 
length of the new prison term, the court must adhere to statutory 
limitations.56 This term of imprisonment, when combined with the 
time a defendant has already served in prison for the original of­
fense, may have the cumulative effect of exceeding the maximum 
term allowed under the statute authorizing the initial imposition of 
supervised release.57 
2. The Sentencing Commission's Approach 
Under 28 U.S.c. § 994(a)(3), Congress required the Sentencing 
Commission to issue guidelines or policy statements concerning 
probation and supervised release violations.58 When the Commis­
51. See Baer, supra note 30 at 289-90. 
52. Id. at 289 (citing United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975». 
53. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e)(3) (1994); Baer, supra note 30, at 289-92 (discussing 
additional procedural protections afforded and not afforded defendants at revocation 
hearings); see also infra note 147. 
54. See 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e). See supra note 38 (discussing these factors). 
55. See id. § 3583(e)(3). Courts are required to consider the factors stated in 
§ 3553(a), just as they would in deciding whether to revoke a tenn of release, in deter­
mining the length of imprisonment upon revocation. See id. § 3583(e). 
56. See id. § 3583(e)(3). This section states that defendants may not be required 
to serve more than five years in prison if the offense that resulted in the tenn of super­
vised release was a Class A felony; more than three years if the offense was a Class B 
felony; more than two years if the offense was a Class C or D felony; and no more than 
one year in any other case. See id. 
57. See Baer, supra note 30, at 292-93 (citing United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 
1282, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1995». 
58. See 28 U.S.c. § 994(a)(3) (1994); U.S. SENIENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 
7, pt. A(l) (1995). See supra note 24 for a comparison of guidelines to policy state­
ments issued by the Sentencing Commission. 
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sion first began establishing a system for sanctioning criminal viola­

tions of probation and supervised release,59 it considered two 

different approaches.60 The first approach was to consider a viola­

tion of probation or supervised release· as a "breach of trust." 

Under this approach, the penalty imposed for the violation would 

be intended to sanction a defendant for failing to abide by the con­

ditions of release.61 Only the seriousness of the conduct constitut­

ing the violation would be considered, "to a limited degree," in 

determining the appropriate sanction.62 The punishment for new 

. criminal conduct would be left to the court responsible for imposing 

the sentence for that offense.63 
Under the second approach, the Commission contemplated 
sanctioning defendants for the particular conduct constituting the 
violation as if that conduct were being sentenced as a new criminal 
offense.64 This option would have called for the application of the 
Sentencing Guideliites "to any [new] criminal conduct that formed 
the basis of the [release] violation ...."65 The defendant's criminal 
history would then have been recalculated to determine the appro­
priate sanction for violating release.66 
The Sentencing Commission elected to adopt the first ap­
proach and treat a violation of probation or supervised release as a 
breach of trust, with the court addressing the violation merely tak­
ing into account the nature of the most recent conduct as well as the 
defendant's history in determining the appropriate punishment.67 
The Commission chose this "breach of trust" approach for several 
reasons, including its belief that the court having jurisdiction over 
the most recent conduct was the more appropriate body to impose 
59. The Sentencing Commission elected to treat probation and supervised release 
as "functionally equivalent" for the purposes of establishing policy statements concern­
ing violations of these forms of court-ordered supervision. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE. 
LINES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary (1995). 
60. See id. ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). The debate focused on how to treat these violations, 
which would constitute violations of release as well new crimes in and of themselves, in 
determining an appropriate sanction. See Itl. 
61. See ill. . 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. See ill. 
65. Id. As would have been the case for any other offense, Chapters Tho and 
Three of the Sentencing Guidelines would have been applied to this new criminal con­
duct. See ill. 
66. See id. Recalculation of the defendant's criminal history would have been 
done under Chapter Four of the Sentencing Guidelines. See ill. 
67. See ill. 
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punishment for that offense.68 It subsequently drafted policy state­
ments regarding violations of probation and supervised release that 
reflected the "breach of trust" approach.69 The statements classify 
probation and supervised release violations into three grades.70 
Depending on the grade of the violation, the court is instructed as 
to the appropriate action.71 Because courts must only consider 
these statements, sentences which do not conform to those recom­
mended by the Commission are not considered departures, and 
"[t]he sentence will likely be affirmed provided the court consid­
ered the Chapter Seven policy statements, the sentence was within 
the statutory maximum, and the sentence was reasonable."72 
3. The Relevant Statutory Amendments 
Since the inception of supervised release system under the Sen­
tencing Reform Act in 1984, Congress has recognized the need for 
new statutory provisions governing particular release violations.?3 
In 1988, 18 U.S.c. § 3583(g) was added as part of the Anti-Drug 
68. See id. The Sentencing Commission also stated that it wanted the sanction 
imposed for the breach of trust to be in addition to, or consecutive to, the sentence 
imposed for the new conduct. It concluded that the second approach would have led to 
duplicated efforts among courts whereby the violation sentence would have often been 
"subsumed" in the sentence imposed for the new conduct itself. Id. 
In addition, the Commission concluded that the second option was impractical be­
cause it was often quite difficult for the sanctioning court to obtain the necessary facts 
and witnesses needed if the Guidelines were to be applied to the new offense. See id. 
69. See id. § 7B1.1. The Commission opted to issue policy statements as opposed 
to guidelines in an effort to first accumulate and later evaluate information and opin­
ions concerning the effectiveness of their sanctions. See id. ch. 7, pt. A(I). 
70. See id. § 7B1.l(a). Grade A violations consist of conduct constituting a fed­
eral, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year 
that is a crime of violence, is a controlled substance offense, is one which involves pos­
session of a firearm or destructive device, or any other federal, state or local offense 
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years. Grade B violations con­
sist of conduct constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Grade C violations consist of conduct con­
stituting a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one 
year or less, or conduct constituting a violation of any other condition of supervised 
release. See id. The Commission notes that these grades of violations are only applica­
ble in cases where the defendant has been placed on supervised release for committing 
a felony or Class A misdemeanor, and do not cover cases in which the defendant was 
under supervision for a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. Such cases are 
dealt with under § IB1.9. See id. ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary. 
71. See id. § 7B1.3 (outlining policy statements governing the revocation, modifi­
cation, and extension of probation and supervised release). 
72. Baer, supra note 30, at 299 (citing United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 93 
n.13 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1994». 
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994) for a chronological list of amendments. 
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Abuse Act,14 establishing mandatory revocation of supervised re­
lease for possession of controlled substances while on supervised 
release.75 Additionally, 18 U.S.c. § 3583(h) was added in 1994 
under the Violent Crime Control Act,76 authorizing the court, upon 
revoking a term of supervised release and sentencing a defendant to 
another term of imprisonment, to place the defendant on another 
term of supervised release following this additional imprisonment.77 
The ex post facto issue examined in this Note arose as courts 
began to apply the new provisions to defendants who had already 
been sentenced to terms of supervised release under the former 
versions of these statutes. These defendants pointed to the fact that 
for these same violations, section 3583(g) originally allowed for ju­
dicial discretion in determining the lengths of new prison terms.78 
Additionally, before the enactment of section 3583(h), courts dif­
fered as to whether they could impose another term of supervised 
release to follow the new term of imprisonment.79 The defendants 
argued that applying the new provisions to their cases constituted 
an ex post facto violation80 because it had the effect of altering the 
terms of their original sentences.81 
74. Pub. L. No. 100-690, TItle VII, § 7303(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4181, 4464 (1988). 
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1988) (amended 1994) (stating that the court shall 
tenninate the tenn of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison 
not less than one-third of the tenn of supervised release). This statute was later 
amended to authorize mandatory revocation for possession of a controlled substance, 
for possession of a fireann in violation of federal law or in violation of a specified 
condition of supervised release, and for refusal to comply with required drug testing. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1994). The limitation concerning the imposed tenn of impris­
onment was also amended and instructed the court not to exceed the maximum tenn of 
imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3). See id. 
76. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505(3), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
77. See § 3583(h). This subsection pertains to cases where a tenn of supervised 
release is revoked and a defendant is required to serve a tenn of imprisonment that is 
less than the maximum tenn of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3). The 
length of the supervised release tenn may not exceed the tenn of supervised release 
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original tenn of supervised 
release, less any tenn of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised 
release. See id. 
78. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 
2529 (1996); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Pas­
kow,l1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1992). 
79. See supra note 9 for examples of cases addressing the effect of subsection (h). 
80. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
Supreme Court's framework for analyzing ex post facto violation claims. 
81. See infra Part II for a discussion of the cases in which this argument was 
confronted. 
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C. The Ex Post Facto Prohibition 
The United States Constitution prohibits both state and federal 
legislatures from passing ex post facto laws.si Calier v. Bulls3 was 
the first case in which the Supreme Court outlined the elements of a 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.84 Since Calder, the Clause 
has been interpreted to prohibit legislative acts that operate to the 
detriment85 of a defendant whose alleged crime was committed 
before the legislative act was enacted.86 
In Weaver v. Graham, the Court provided two explicit pur­
poses for prohibiting ex post facto laws: assuring "that legislative 
Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely 
on their meaning until explicitly changed,"87 and preventing "arbi­
trary and potentially vindictive" legislative acts.88 The Court stated 
that "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal 
82. See u.s. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, regarding the federal government, providing 
that: "No Bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CaNST. art. I, 
§ 10, regarding state governments, providing that: "No state shall ... pass any Bill of 
Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law ...." 
83. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
84. In Calder, Justice Chase provided four characteristics of ex post facto laws: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict 
the offender. 
Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted). 
85. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 
282, 294 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 390. 
86. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29. For a general discussion of the ex post facto 
clauses, see Derek J.T. Adler, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Changes in Evidentiary 
Law: Repeal of Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1191, 
1192-1201 (1987); see also William Winslow Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Consti­
tutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 539 (1947); Oliver P. 
Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315 (1922); Harold J. Krent, 
The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 2143 (1996); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes an Ex Post 
Facto Law Prohibited by Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1146 (1978). 
87. Id. at 28-29 (citing Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 298; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 
229 (1883); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387). 
88. Id. at 29 (citations omitted). Weaver involved a new Florida statute which 
reduced the amount of "good time" credits a prisoner could earn for good conduct. See 
id. at 26. Florida attempted to apply the statute to prisoners sentenced before its enact­
ment. See id. at 27. The Supreme Court held that this retroactive application of the 
new law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it made it more difficult for most 
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consequences of acts completed before its effective date."89 Addi­
tionally, the Weaver Court outlined two essential elements needed 
for a law to violate the ex post facto prohibition. FIrst, "it must be 
retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its 
enactment ...."90 Second, "it must disadvantage the offender af­
fected by it."91 
The most recent Supreme Court cases concerning the Ex Post 
Facto Clause have stated the Weaver test somewhat differently. In 
Collins v. Youngblood,92 the Court focused its inquiry on whether 
the legislation enacted after the defendant's conduct had been com­
mitted retroactively altered the definition of the crime or increased 
the corresponding punishment.93 Subsequently, in California De­
partment of Co"ections v. Morales,94 the Court explicitly stated 
that Collins had correctly expressed the ex post facto analytical 
framework.95 The Morales Court stated that "[a]fter Collins, the 
focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative 
change produces some ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage,' ... but on 
whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or 
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable."96 
inmates to accumulate credits. See iii. at 35-36. The Court stated that the law "con­
stricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early release ...." Id. 
89. Id. at 31. The Court also stated that "the ex post facto prohibition ... forbids 
the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when 
the act[sJ to be punished occurred." Id. at 30. 
90. Id. at 29. 
91. Id. (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,401 (1937); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 390); accord Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987). 
92. 497 U.S. 37 (1990). 
93. See iii. at 43. The Court in Collins made reference to language used in an­
other Supreme Court ex post facto case, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925). See iii. at 
42. 	 In defining the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Oause, the Beazell Court stated that: 
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation 
may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previ­
ously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burden­
some the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time 
when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. 
Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70. 
94. 514 U.S. 499 (1995). 
95. See iii. at 504 n.3. 
96. Id. Although the Morales Court made it clear that this prong of the Court's 
ex post facto test had been refined, it is not clear what impact, if any, the decision 
actually had on its application. In Morales, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for the murder of his wife, but was entitled to parole reviews annually 
thereafter. See iii. at 503. California subsequently changed its law to authorize the 
California Board of Prison Thrms to defer parole hearings for up to three years for 
prisoners convicted of more than one offense involving the taking of a life. See iii. The 
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Essentially, the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis at­
tempts to determine whether the law in question has made the pen­
alty for a crime more severe subsequent to the time when that 
crime was committed. In applying the test to the supervised release 
cases, the courts of appeals deciding this issue have struggled with 
the following question: to which "event" is the new law being ap­
plied, the original offense or the violation of release? To resolve 
this question, the courts have had to draw comparisons to other 
lines of cases confronting similar ex post facto claims. The follow­
ing section discusses these analogies. 
D. 	 Application of the Ex Post Facto Analysis: Parole Violation 
and Repeat Offender Statutes 
In examining the supervised release cases under the Supreme 
Court's ex post facto analysis, the five courts of appeals that have 
considered this issue have compared their cases to those involving 
either parole violation or repeat offender statutes.97 These two 
lines of cases have involved similar ex post facto violation claims, 
producing differing results. Consequently, the courts 'of appeals de­
ciding the supervised release cases, by incorporating the reasoning 
used in either the parole violation or repeat offender situations, 
have reached conflicting conclusions. 
defendant was later denied parole and, under the new law, the next review hearing was 
set for three years later. See id. 
The Court held that the mere increase in intervals between parole hearings did not 
constitute an increase in punishment for ex post facto purposes. See id. at 1605. It 
reasoned that the change in parole policies was done merely to avoid needless hearings 
for prisoners who had "no reasonable chance of being released." See id. at 504. The 
Court reached its conclusion without calling into question the holdings of Weaver and 
Miller. Moreover, the Court's re-articulation of the ex post facto analysis involved only 
the second half of the Weaver test, that focusing on whether the law in question "disad­
vantaged" the defendant. Conversely, the issue examined in this Note does not involve 
the question of whether the new supervised release provisions disadvantaged the de­
fendants, but whether these provisions were retroactive. Consequently, the retroactiv­
ity portion of the analysis, as stated in Weaver, remains pertinent to the issue discussed 
in this Note. 
The Supreme Court's most recent application of the ex post facto analysis appears 
in the case of Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). In Lynce, the Court again dealt 
with the issue of whether a newly enacted state statute "disadvantaged" a defendant by 
increasing the punishment for the defendant's original crime. See id. at 895. 
97. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
have compared the supervised release statutes to those governing parole violations. 
Only the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has decided that the repeat offender 
analogy is more accurate. See infra Part II for a discussion of these cases. 
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1. Statutes Governing Parole Violations 
The courts of appeals that have found ex post facto violations 
to exist in the supervised release cases have compared supervised 
release to parole.98 These courts, in identifying similarities between 
the two systems, have turned to ex post facto cases involving the 
retroactive99 application of new parole violation statutes to support 
their holdings.loo The parole violation cases prohibited retroactive 
changes that imposed greater legal obstacles to early release, gener­
ally through the forfeiture of "good-time" credits. lol 
The principal case involving the retroactive application of al­
tered parole violation statutes is Greenfield v. Scafati,l02 a case from 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
which the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. In Greenfield, 
the defendant was sentenced to five to seven years in prison for his 
original crime.103 Under Massachusetts law at the time of sentenc­
ing, prisoners could accumulate "good-conduct" credits while in 
98. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that 
"supervised release, like parole, is an integral part of the punishment for the underlying 
offense"); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873,881 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that parole 
and supervised release "are virtually identical systems" in that under both, "a defendant 
serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a portion under supervision outside prison 
walls"); accord United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 1996). 
In Meeks, the United States Court .pf Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowl­
edged that supervised release and probation had been treated as being essentially 
equivalent by both Congress and the Sentencing Commission. See Meeks, 25 F.3d at 
1121. The Second Circuit then referred to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), which stated, under due process analysis that there is 
no constitutional difference between probation and parole. See id. Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit concluded that there was "no persuasive reason to distinguish between 
the standards of parole eligibility ... and the conditions for revocation of supervised 
release." Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1121 (quoting United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526 
n.2 (4th Cir. 1992». 
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of these and other cases relying on the similar­
ity between parole and supervised release for the purposes of ex post facto analysis. 
99. "Retroactive" has been defined as the "[p]rocess of acting with reference to 
past occurrences." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990). "Retroactive laws" 
have been defined as "those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under 
existing laws, create new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in 
respect to the transactions or considerations already past." Id. 
100. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of these cases. 
101. See Krent, supra note 86, at 2148-49 (providing a summary of major case law 
addressing this issue). '''Good-time' credit is awarded for [an inmate's] good conduct 
and reduces [the] period of [the] sentence which [the] prisoner must spend in prison 
although it does not reduce the period of the sentence itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTION­
ARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). 
102. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S. 
713 (1968). 
103. See Greenfield, 277 F. Supp. at 644. 
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prison, thereby advancing the date of release.104 After the defend­
ant's sentencing, the statute was amended whereby good-conduct 
credits would be forfeited for parole violations. lOS The defendant 
subsequently violated his parole, and was required to forfeit his 
gOOd-conduct credits.106 
The district court held that the application of the new law vio­
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increased the punishment 
of the defendant's original sentence.107 As a result, courts have 
held that statutes forfeiting good-time credits for parole violations 
cannot be applied to defendants whose original offenses were com­
mitted before the statute's enactment. lOS 
2. Repeat Offender Statutes 
The opposing position taken by the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that, for ex post facto purposes, supervised re­
lease statutes are more akin to repeat offender, or recidivist stat­
utes, which impose enhanced penalties on individuals who have 
repeatedly committed crimes.l OO These statutes allow courts to con­
sider crimes committed before the enactment of the recidivist stat­
ute.110 In holding that these statutes do not violate the Ex Post 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 645. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 645-46. The district court in Greenfield stated that "[d]epriving one 
of time off to which he was justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending his 
sentence and increasing his punishment." Id. at 645 (quoting Lembersky v. Parole Bd., 
124 N.E.2d 521, 524 (Mass. 1955». The court added that depriving a prisoner of the 
right to earn good-conduct credits "materially 'alters the situation of the accused to his 
disadvantage.'" Id. at 646 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890»; see also Warden 
v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 663 (1974) (holding that parole eligibility is annexed to the 
original sentence); Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding un­
constitutional the retroactive application of a new statute enhancing the penalties for 
parole violations); Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 1987) (invalidating 
the retroactive application of a new parole law which delayed an inmate's ability to earn 
parole). 
108. See, e.g., Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989); Beebe v. Phelps, 
650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (per curium); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 
(2d Cir. 1977). 
109. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the argument that supervised release 
statutes are similar to recidivist statutes for ex post facto purposes. 
110. Recidivist statutes have been justified by the Supreme Court as deterring 
repeat offenders and segregating from the rest of society those individuals who repeat­
edly commit crimes over an extended period of time. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263,284-85 (1980) (defining the primary goals of recidivist statutes). 
For various discussions of the treatment of repeat offender statutes by courts, see 
Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 99 
(1971); Michael Zebendilos Okpala, Repeat Offender Statutes-Do They Create a Sepa­
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Facto Clause, courts have viewed the increased punishment as at­
taching only to the defendant's most recent conduct, not the origi­
nal offense.111 
The principal case upholding recidivist statutes against ex post 
facto attack is Gryger v. Burke .112 In Gryger, the Supreme Court 
upheld a life sentence for a defendant who was charged as a fourth­
time offender, even though one of these crimes had been commit­
ted before passage of the recidivist statute.113 The Court stated that 
"[t]he sentence as a fourth offender ... is not to be viewed as either 
a new jeopardy or additional penalty for earlier crimes. It is a stiff­
ened penalty for the latest crime ...."114 
Courts have used the foregoing information for guidance in un­
derstanding the nature of the supervised release system as well as in 
addressing the ex post facto implications of applying the new statu­
tory provisions. With a general understanding of supervised re­
lease, the ex post facto prohibition, as well as the parole and repeat 
offender lines of cases, the decisions of the United States courts of 
appeals can more easily be understood and examined. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE ALTERATION OF SUPERVISED 





The current split in the United States courts of appeals con­
cerning the application of the new supervised release statutes has 
centered on how to characterize supervised release violation pun­
ishments. More specifically, the courts of appeals have struggled 
with the issue of what the punishment represents-a part of the 
original sentence or a sentence in and of itself? In deciding this 
rate Offense?, 32 How. L.J. 185 (1989); Jill C. Rafaloff, The Armed Career Criminal Act: 
Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1988); 
Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965); Note, 
Court Treatment of General RecidiVist Statutes, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 238 (1948); Note, 
Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 597-607 (1962). 
111. See e.g., United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977). This reasoning is consistent with early Supreme 
Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws which provided enhanced pun­
ishments for repeat offenders. See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676 (1895) 
(holding that the increased severity of the punishment is not a second punishment for 
the same offense, but rather is a more severe punishment for a subsequent offense); see 
also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 
(1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901). 
112. 334 U.S. 728 (1948). 
113. See id. at 732. 
114. Id. 
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question, the courts of appeals have turned to various sources for 
assistance, including the Sentencing Commission's policy state­
ments as well as analogous interpretations of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause in the cases involving parole violation and repeat offender 
statutes. 
A. 	 Supervised Release Violation Statutes: Continuing Punishment 
for the Original Offense 
In concluding that the application of the new statutory provi­
sions concerning supervised release violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, a number of courts of appeals have held that sanctions im­
posed for supervised release violations constitute punishment for 
the defendant's original crime. As a result, these courts have con­
cluded that the provisions governing supervised release violations 
cannot be altered after the defendant's original crime has been 
committed. For example, in United States v. Paskow,115 the defend­
ant pled guilty to conspiracy to receive the proceeds of a bank rob­
bery and receiving the proceeds of a bank robbery, conduct which 
was committed in May of 1988, and was sentenced to eight months 
in prison and three years supervised release.116 
When the defendant committed his crimes, 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3583(e)(4) limited the length of imprisonment that could be im­
posed upon the revocation of a term of supervised release, with the 
length of any sentence under the maximum left to the judge's dis­
cretion.117 However, the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988118 brought a new provision, section 3583(g), which required 
mandatory terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised 
release for possession of a controlled substance.119 In 1990, the de­
fendant in Paskow tested positive for marijuana and cocaine use.120 
As a result, the court revoked the defendant's supervised release 
and, under the terms of section 3583(g), he was given the 
mandatory prison sentence of twelve months, one-third of his term 
of supervised release.l21 
Under the former version of the statute, the sentencing court 
115. 	 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993). 
116. 	 See id. at 875-76. 
117. See id. at 876. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4) was, at the end of 1988, redesignated 
as 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994). 
118. 	 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4418, 4464 (1988). 
119. 	 See supra Part lB.3 for a discussion of § 3583(g). 
120. 	 See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 876. 
121. 	 See id. 
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had the authority to exercise discretion upon revocation, in which 
case the defendant in Paskow could possibly have received a 
shorter term of imprisonment, or no term at all.l22 Consequently, 
the defendant argued that the application of section 3583(g) to his 
conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it altered the 
punishment imposed for a crime which had been committed before 
the statute's enactment.123 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit agreed for two reasons. First, the court, applying the 
Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis,124 stated that application of 
the amended statute "disadvantaged" the defendant because it 
changed the defendant's eligibility to receive a lesser sentence.l25 
Second, and more importantly, the court concluded that the sanc­
tions imposed for supervised release violations constituted a por­
tion of the sentence for the defendant's original crime and therefore 
the violation itself could not be considered a new offense for ex 
post facto purposes.l26 Accordingly, the court held that the applica­
tion of the terms of the amended statute retroactively applied to 
conduct committed before the enactment of the statute, thereby vi­
olating the Ex Post Facto Clause.127 
Perhaps the most crucial part of the court's analysis in Paskow 
was the comparison of supervised release to parole.l28 The court 
relied on Greenfield v. Sca/ati,129 which struck down a similar appli­
cation of an amended parole violation statute under the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.130 The court in Paskow concluded that, for ex post 
facto purposes, parole and supervised release were equivalent, and 
therefore Greenfield controlled the outcome.l3l The court stressed 
122. See itt. 
123. See itt. 
124. See supra Part I.e and accompanying notes for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court's method of ex post facto analysis. 
125. See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 877 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401­
02 (1937». 
126. See itt. at 883. 
127. See itt. 
128. See itt. at 877-82. 
129. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S. 
713 (1968). See supra Part I.D.1 for a discussion of Greenfield and the retroactive ap­
plication of amended parole violation statutes. 
130. See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 878. 
131. See itt. at 880. The court stated that the parole and supervised release sys­
tems are both forms of post-imprisonment supervision. In both cases, it is the original 
sentence which determines how long the term will be and establishes the punishment 
for revocation upon violation. Conduct which violates terms of both supervised release 
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that the parole cases have consistently recognized parole eligibility 
as being an inherent part of the original sentence for the original 
crime because the "terms and conditions [of parole eligibility] are 
fixed at the moment the underlying offense is complete."132 Adher­
ing to this reasoning, the Paskow court concluded that like the con­
ditions affecting parole eligibility, the terms and conditions· of 
supervised release cannot be retrospectively altered.133 
Additionally, the Paskow court looked to the language of the 
statute governing supervised release to support the conclusion that 
terms of supervised release relate to the original sentence. The 
court stated that section 3583(a), which allowed the sentencing 
court to impose a term of supervised release, contained the lan­
guage: "may include as part of the sentence the requirement that the 
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprison­
ment."I34 The court also considered the language of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which treats supervised release as part of the original 
sentence to be imposed at the time of sentencing.135 
The Paskow court also referred to a previous Fourth Circuit 
decision, United States v. Parriett. l36 In Parriett, the court found 
that the application of section 3583(g) to a defendant who commit­
ted his original crime before that section's enactment violated the 
and parole "simply triggers the execution of the conditions of the original sentence." 
Id. at 881. 
Not mentioned by the Ninth Circuit in Paskow was the case of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, '. 
411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, the Supreme Court stated that "[d]espite the un­
doubted minor differences between probation and parole, the commentators have 
agreed that revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is 
constitutionally indistingt!ishable from the revocation of parole." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 
782 n.3. 
132. Paskow, 11 F.3d at 879. 
133. See iii. at 878-79 (citing Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1987); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 
Unit A July 1981); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977». In Beebe, the Court 
of Appeals for the FIfth Circuit stated that "[t]he practical effect [of applying the 
amended parole revocation statute] is a statutory increase in punishment for the first 
offense, enacted subsequent to the commission of the offense." Beebe, 650 F.2d at 776. 
134. Paskow, 11 F.3d at 882. Section 3583(a) states: "The court, in imposing a 
sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as part of 
the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised re­
lease after imprisonment ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994). 
135. See iii. The Sentencing Guidelines state: "A term of supervised release may 
be imposed by the court as a part of the sentence of imprisonment at the time of initial 
sentencing." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A (1995). See supra 
notes 35-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the imposition of supervised 
release. 
136. 4 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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Ex Post Facto Clause.137 The Parriett court based its decision pri­
marily on the holding of Fender v. Thompson,138 a case in which the 
application of a revised statute regarding parole eligibility was 
found to have violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.139 
The Fourth Circuit in Paskow also cited United States v. 
Flora,140 a case from the United States District Court for the West­
ern District of Kentucky. In Flora, the district court relied on the 
holding in Parriett, the language of section 3583 itself, as well as the 
Sentencing Guidelines in concluding that "supervised release, and 
the possibility of revocation and· additional imprisonment, are as 
much the consequence of the offender's underlying crime as is the 
initial term of imprisonment. "141 Thereafter, the court in Flora 
found that the application of section 3583(g) to the defendant 
would retroactively alter the punishment relating to the original of­
fense, thereby constituting an ex post facto violation.142 
Both the Second and Seventh Circuits raised another argument 
for finding an ex post facto violation in the supervised release cases. 
These courts of appeals found it significant that the conduct consti­
tuting supervised release violations is often not criminal and, there­
fore, punishment for such violations must be a part of the 
punishment for the original crime.143 United States v. Beals, a Sev­
137. See itl. at 526. 
138. 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989). 
139. See Parrietl, 974 F.2d at 526. In Fender, the defendant was found guilty of 
various crimes and was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Fender, 883 F.2d at 304. At 
the time these crimes were committed, Vtrginia law allowed the defendant to become 
eligible for parole after serving fifteen years of the sentence. See itl. Vtrginia later 
amended its parole eligibility statute to declare all persons sentenced to life imprison­
ment who escape from a correctional facility ineligible for parole. See itl. The defend­
ant escaped and was later recaptured. See itl. His parole eligibility was revoked 
pursuant to the revised statute. See itl. In finding an ex post facto violation, the Fourth 
Circuit stated that the application of the revised statute in this case constituted a "post 
hoc alteration of the punishment for an earlier offense." [d. at 306-07. The court spe­
cifically rejected the argument that no ex post facto violation should be found because 
the defendant was "on notice" of the change in the law. See itl. The court reasoned 
that "the challenged statute nevertheless accomplished an impermissible enhancement 
of the punishment for an earlier, unrelated crime." [d. at 307. 
140. 810 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
141. [d. at 843. 
142. See itl. at 843-44. 
143. See United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854,859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
because a supervised release violation many times will not constitute illegal conduct in 
and of itself, the punishment imposed for such conduct must be linked to the original 
offense for ex post facto purposes); see also United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122 
(2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[i)f the individual may be punished for an action that is not 
of itself a crime, the rationale must be that the punishment is part of the sanction for the 
original conduct that was a crime"). 
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enth Circuit case, involved the application of 18 U.S.c. § 3583(h), 
which authorized the imposition of an additional term of supervised 
release following revocation and imprisonment, to a defendant sen­
tenced before that statute's enactment.l44 The Seventh Circuit, 
combining the parole analogy with the non-criminal argument, con­
cluded that punishments imposed for violations of both parole and 
supervised release are inevitably tied to the defendant's original 
criminal conduct.145 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Meeks, also reasoned 
that proceedings regarding supervised release violations are not 
subject to the same constitutional protections that would apply if 
such violations were deemed new criminal offenses.l46 Particularly, 
The Beals court identified failure to support dependents, failure to work conscien­
tiously, and failure to undergo medical treatment as examples of non-criminal super­
vised release violations. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60. 
144. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 856. To demonstrate how the imposition of subsection 
(h) disadvantaged the defendant, the Beals court provided a hypothetical. A defendant 
is convicted of a felony and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be followed by a 
three-year term of supervised release. The defendant serves his prison time and is re­
leased, but one year into his term, he commits a violation. Prior to the enactment of 
subsection (h), the maximum penalty a court could impose in this situation, under sub­
section (b)(3), was two years imprisonment. After serving that sentence, the govern­
ment's supervision of the defendant would end. However, with the enactment of 
subsection (h), the court has the authority to sentence a defendant to a combination of 
imprisonment and supervised release over those two years-for example, one year in 
prison and one year on supervised release. If the defendant subsequently commits a 
violation during this second term of release, the court has the authority to send the 
defendant back to prison for up to one year (the two-year maximum less the one-year 
term of imprisonment already served). Consequently, the defendant's total punishment 
would equal two and a half years after the initial revocation of supervised release (the 
one year in prison, the six months on supervised release, and then another year in 
prison). The Beals court concluded that this total was six months longer than that 
which would have been allowed before the enactment of subsection (h). See iii. at 858. 
But see supra note 9 for citation of cases in which application of subsection (h) was 
found not to disadvantage defendants sentenced prior to the enactment of subsection 
(h). 
145. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60. The Beals court also disposed of the theory that 
punishment for supervised release violations is identical to situations where punishment 
is imposed against defendants who have repeatedly committed crimes under recidivist 
laws. See iii. at 859. In cases involving repetitive criminal behavior, courts have been 
allowed to use prior offenses, despite the existence of ex post facto claims, to punish 
defendants more severely for their most recent crimes. See supra Part I.D.2 for a dis­
cussion of recidivist statutes. The Beals court distinguished these cases in stating that 
"[t]he increased punishment imposed under a recidivist statute is triggered by subse­
quent conduct that is itself a crime. The government punishes that conduct because of 
its nature, not because of the ... original offense. Therefore, it is logical to link the 
increased punishment only to the SUbsequent conduct for ex post facto purposes." 
Beals, 87 F.3d at 859. 
146. See Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1122. 
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these proceedings are not governed by the right to a jury trial or the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.147 The Meeks court 
stated that "[these] constitutional protections have been ruled inap­
plicable because the conduct that violates the conditions of super­
vised release is not viewed as a separate criminal offense."148 
Because the supervised release violation did not constitute a new 
offense, the court reasoned that application of new statutory provi­
sions has the effect of changing the legal consequences of acts com­
pleted before the statute's effective date to the defendant's 
disadvantage.149 
B. 	 Supervised Release Violation Statutes: Punishment for a New 
Offense 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, con­
trary to the holdings of four other courts of appeals, held that the 
application of the new statutory provision governing supervised re­
lease violations did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because 
147. See id. (citing United States v. Grisanti, 4 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187,189 (7th Cir. 1986); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 
1303, 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1977». 
The court's reasoning relies on the fact that, for revocation purposes, violations of 
supervised release and probation have been treated virtually the same by both Con­
gress and the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994) (instructing 
the court, in determining the need for revocation of supervised release, to adhere to the 
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation"); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. B, introductory commentary (1995) 
(stating that "[b]ecause these policy statements focus on the violation of the court-or­
dered supervision, this chapter ... treats violations of the conditions of probation and 
supervised release as functionally equivalent"). See supra notes 48-53 and accompany­
ing text for a discussion of supervised release revocation hearings. Moreover, probation 
revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings, and, therefore, not all constitutional 
procedural protections apply. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); 
see also Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1985) (no double jeopardy 
protection); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-89 (1973) (stating that probation 
revocation is not a stage of criminal prosecution); Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476, 
478-79 (11th Cir. 1982) (no right to jury determination). 
Therefore, the argument maintains that because new crimes require full constitu­
tional protection, the punishments imposed for supervised release violations would also 
have to be accompanied by the same procedural protections in order to avoid an ex 
post facto violation. Because supervised release violation proceedings do not require 
full procedural protection, punishments for supervised release violations must be linked 
to the original crime. Consequently, amended punishments may not be imposed upon 
defendants who were sentenced under the former version of the law. See Meeks, 25 
F.3d at 1122-23. 
148. Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1123. The court went on to state that "any enhancement 
of the punishment for the supervised-release violation should be viewed primarily as an 
enhancement of the penalties for the past acts, rather than for the subsequent acts." [d. 
149. 	 See id. at 1120. See also Beals, 87 F.3d at 860. 
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the violation constituted a new criminal offense, one committed af­
ter the statute's enactment. In United States v. Reese,150 the defend­
ant was convicted of participating in a conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine in November of 1988 and was sentenced to 33 months of 
imprisonment to be followed by a five year term of supervised re­
lease.151 Like the defendants in the other supervised release cases, 
terms of imprisonment after revocation were limited under section 
3583(e)4).152 However, after the enactment of section 3583(g), the 
defendant in Reese was subject to the mandatory prison term of not 
less than one-third of the term of supervised release for any viola­
tion involving possession of a controlled substance.153 From 1991 to 
1992, while on supervised release, the defendant repeatedly tested 
positive for cocaine use. l54 Consequently, applying the new statute, 
the court revoked the defendant's term of supervised release and 
sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment.155 
The Sixth Circuit held that the application of section 3583(g) 
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.156 In reaching this conclu­
sion, the court challenged the principal arguments relied upon by 
the other courts of appeals in finding an ex post facto violation. 
First, the Reese court disagreed with the contention that parole and 
supervised release were equivalent.157 It stated that unlike parole, 
terms of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised re­
lease were not limited to the terms allowable under the original of­
fense. 158 The court added that "it is possible that an individual will 
have already served the maximum prison sentence allowed under 
the guidelines ... [and] a [subsequent] violation of that supervised 
release, even in the final days of the release period, could result in 
150. 71 F.3d 582 (6th CiT. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996). 
151. See id. at 584. 
152. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4) (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(3) (1994». 
153. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1988) (amended 1994». 
154. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 584. 
155. See id. The statutory minimum prison term for the defendant in Reese was 
twenty months. See id. 
156. See id. at 591. 
157. See id. at 587-88. 
158. See id. at 587. It should be noted that while the court appeared to be con­
trasting supervised release and parole at this point in its analysis, it used the terms 
probation and parole interchangeably. See id. The court noted that under 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3565 (1994), terms of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation are limited 
to the term allowable under the original offense. See id. (emphasis added). Thus, it 
appears that the court's objective was to distinguish supervised release from both pa­
role and probation~ 
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additional prison time."159 Consequently, the Reese court reasoned 
that violations of supervised release could produce a "cumulative 
punishment that exceeds the original prison sentence."160 In sup­
port of this conclusion, the court quoted United States v. Wright,161 
a prior Sixth Circuit case, for the proposition that "[c]onnecting the 
resentencing period with the maximum period of incarceration al­
lowed for the original offense would undermine the system of su­
pervised -rele~se . . .."162 , 
In finding an "inherent difference" between supervised release 
and parole, Jhe court dismissed the analogies made by the other 
circuits.163 In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the lan­
guage of the Sentencing Commission contrasting parole and super­
vised release.l64 The court also distinguished this case from 
Greenfield v. Scafati,165 stating that Greenfield involved an altera­
tion- of the defendant's original sentence while the present case in­
volved the alteration of the punishment for a new offense, the 
violation of supervised release, occurring after - the date of 
alteration.166 
159. Id. at 588. 
160. Id. (citing United States v. Smeathers, 930 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1990». To demonstrate the difference, 
the court provided the example of a defendant sentenced to nine years in prison and 
released on parole after three years. A violation of that parole could result in a maxi­
mum term of imprisonment of six years. Under the supervised release system, the de­
fendant could receive additional prison time, regardless of the amount of time already 
served. See id. at 587-88. The court added that if the system was structured otherwise, 
"a person on supervised release could violate his release conditions with impunity if he 
had already served his full original sentence." Id. at 588; see also United States v. 
Robinson, 62 F.3d 1282, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that a term of imprisonment 
imposed upon revocation of supervised release, when combined with the time a defend­
ant has already served in prison, may exceed the maximum prison term allowed under 
the statute giving rise to the original crime). 
161. 2 F.3d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1993). 
162. Reese, 71 F.3d at 588. The court in Wright added that "[t]he possibility of 
reincarceration for violation of a condition of supervised release is a cornerstone of the 
sentencing structure." Wright, 2 F.3d at 179 (quoting United States v. Stephenson, 928 
F.2d 728, 730-31 (6th Cir. 1991)}. 
163. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 587-88. 
164. See id. at 587. 
165. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S. 
713 (1968). 
166. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. Specifically, the Reese court stated that Greenfield 
stood for the notion that rules governing good-time credits could not be altered and 
applied to individuals serving a prison sentence for their original crime (which occurred 
before the enactment of the new rule). The Reese court argued that, to the contrary, 
the defendant in its case was not serving additional time for his original offense under 
the new statute, but for the violation of release. See supra Part 1.0.1 for a discussion of 
Greenfield. 
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Second, the Sixth Circuit found that the penalties imposed for 
supervised release violations were not connected to the original of­
fense. The court compared the supervised release violation statutes 
to recidivist laws which have long been upheld against ex post facto 
attack.t67 The court reasoned that, like recidivist statutes, statutes 
governing supervised release violations punish the most recent of­
fense, not the original.l68 The punishment which accompanied that 
new offense was enhanced because of the defendant's prior his­
tory.169 Accordingly, the court held that the alteration and applica­
tion of statutes governing supervised release violations in these 
cases did not constitute an ex post facto violation because the new 
statutory punishment was enacted before the defendant's miscon­
duct had taken place.170 The court further stated that its reasoning 
was consistent with the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis in 
that the amended statute did not increase the punishment assigned 
to the original crime.l71 
167. See iii. at 588. See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of recidivist statutes and 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit was the only court to compare the supervised re­
lease cases to a line of cases involving 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 1326 (1994». See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589. In these cases, an illegal alien commit­
ted some offense and, as a result, was deported. See id. After deportation, Congress 
enacted a new statute which imposed a greater punishment for any alien who had com­
mitted an "aggravated felony" and who later illegally reentered the country. See iii. 
The alien would then reenter the country and would be sentenced under the new stat­
ute. See id. In upholding this law against ex post facto attack, several courts of appeals 
have held that "the enhanced punishment simply was not 'for the earlier offense' even 
though the punishment was a 'but for' consequence of that earlier offense." Reese, 71 
F.3d at 589 (citing United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730 
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. 1994». 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Arzate-Nunez, explicitly distin­
guished the supervised release statute at issue in United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 
(9th Cir. 1993), from the statute at issue in its case. See Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d at 735. 
The court stated that an ex post facto violation was found in Paskow because of the 
"integral relationship [between the statute governing supervised release violations and] 
... the defendant's predicate offense." Id. It added that the defendant in its case was, 
"unlike the defendant in Paskow, ... being punished for a new offense, reentering the 
country." Id. It stressed the lack of procedural protection afforded defendants in su­
pervised release violation proceedings as opposed to the protection afforded the de­
fendant in its case. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Arzate-Nunez concluded that the statute at 
issue was more analogous to repeat offender laws because the defendant's reentry con­
stituted a new offense "for due process purposes, and also for ex post facto purposes." 
Id. 
168. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. 
169. See iii. at 588. 
170. See iii. at 590. 
171. See iii. at 590-91. The court stated that the defendant was given "fair warn­
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The Sixth Circuit in Reese also dismissed the argument that the 
application of the amended supervised release statutes implicated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause because violations of supervised release 
were not subject to full constitutional procedural protection.l12 The 
court stated that no other cases confronting ex post facto violation 
claims had ever considered this issue in determining the existence 
of a violation.173 Additionally, the court stated that similarly re­
laxed procedural protections currently existed in cases involving 
prison misconduct punishments, and that courts had not found ex 
post facto violations to exist where those regulations had been en­
acted after the defendant's original crime had been committed.174 
ing" of the amended statute's effect. In using this language, the court was making refer­
ence to the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause as outlined in both Weaver v. Graham, 
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981), and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987). See Reese, 71 
F.3d at 590. It also stated that their conclusion was consistent with Collins v. Young­
blood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), and California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 
1597 (1995) in that the amended statute did not increase the penalty for the defendant's 
original offense. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590-91. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of 
these cases which outline the Supreme Court's ex post facto analysis and provide the 
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
The court clarified its pOSition by stating that the new statutory provisions affected 
all individuals who had committed the same original offense as the defendant equally. 
See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. In other words, it was not until the defendant violated his 
release that the new statutory provision was applied. The court concluded that because 
the punishment at issue did not reach every prisoner who had committed the same 
earlier conduct, "it [could] hardly be logically argued that the punishment [was] being 
imposed 'because of the earlier conduct." Id. See infra Part I1I.C for an analysis of 
this argument. 
172. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the procedural protection argument. 
173. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 589. 
174. See id. at 590 (citing Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995); Ewell 
v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482,485 (4th Cir. 1993». Both Gilbert and Ewell involved the enact­
ment of prison regulations requiring inmates to provide blood samples before final dis­
charge, parole, or release. Failure or refusal to do so would result in a loss of good-time 
credit. Inmates who were imprisoned before these regulations went into effect argued 
that requiring them to comply would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it would 
retroactively alter the good-time accumulation system. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238; 
Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485. 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits did not 
find ex post facto violations in these cases. Both courts of appeals held that the statutes 
in question constituted reasonable prison regulations which were not penal in nature. 
See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 484. "Penal" has been defined as 
"[p]unishable; inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or relating to a penalty." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1132 (6th ed. 1990). Because the enforcement of these stat­
utes did not constitute additional punishment, they could be applied to all inmates, 
regardless of when these inmates were sentenced. See Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485. In Gilbert, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that" '[c]hanges in conditions of confinement ... and denials 
of privileges-matters which every prisoner can anticipate are contemplated by his 
original admission to prison-are necessarily functions of prison management.... Gil­
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The conclusions reached by the varying courts of appeals are a 
reflection of, for the most part, their opinions as to which analogy is 
most accurate. Four courts of appeals held that applying the new 
provisions retroactively alters a defendant's punishment, analogous 
to the parole cases. Conversely, the Sixth Circuit held that the new 
statutory provisions regarding supervised release violations provide 
enhanced punishment fQr the most recent ,conduct, the violation. 
For this reason, the Sixth' Circuit concluded that these provisions 
should be considered the same as recidivist statutes under ex post 
facto analysis. The following section questions the Sixth Circuit's 
decision. 
III. LEGAL. ANALYSIS 
The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Reese created a 
circuit split by characterizing supervised release violations as in­
dependent offenses for the purposes of ex post facto analysis, sepa­
rate from the original conduct that gave rise to the imposition of the 
supervised release term.t75 The court in Reese did not accept the 
interpretation that sanctions imposed for supervised release viola­
tions were inherently part of the sentence for the crime that was 
committed before the statutory amendments went into effect.176 
Rather, the court viewed defendants violating conditions of super­
vised release as being equivalent to repeat offenders.177 As a result, 
the court concluded that the punishment imposed for violations of 
bert, 55 F.3d at 239 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992)). In 
Ewell, the Fourth Circuit added that prison regulations "are not frozen at the time Qf 
each inmate's conduct, but rather, they may be subject to reasonable amendments as 
necessary for good prison administration ... without implicating ex post facto con­
cerns." Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86. 
The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that, unlike several of the parole cases involving 
the alteration of rules governing good-time accumulation, specifically Weaver v. Gra­
ham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the prison regulation statutes did not effect the structure of the 
good-time system. See Ewell, 11 F.3d at 486-87. Rather, the regulations in question 
would result in a loss of good-time credits only if an infraction were to take place. All 
such infractions would have occurred after the enactment of the regulations. See iii. at 
487. 
From the reasoning used in these cases, the court in Reese concluded that "[i]f 
relaxed standards for punishment ... could only be justified by being subsumed under 
the rubric of the original sentence, it would never be possible to impose prison miscon­
duct punishments ... on prisoners violating rules enacted after the beginning of their 
sentences, even where they had full notice of proscribed behavior." Reese, 71 F.3d at 
590. 
175. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. 
176. See iii. at 590-91. 
177. See iii. at 588. 
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release sanctioned only the defendant's most recent conduct.178 
At the heart of the Sixth Circuit's decision are two critical find­
ings. First, the court found that the sanction imposed for violating 
conditions of supervised release did not constitute a component of a 
defendant's original sentence. Second, the court found that viola­
tions of supervised release could be deemed equivalent to the 
crimes that are subjected to enhanced punishments under repeat 
offender laws. Because the Sixth Circuit stands alone in its reason­
ing as well as in its characterization of supervised release violations, 
this analysis examines these findings as well as the other principal 
conclusions upon which the court relied. More specifically, this 
analysis offers reasons to question the Sixth Circuit's holding in 
Reese regarding the ex post facto implications of applying the 
amended supervised release statutory provisions. 
A. 	 The Supervised Release Violation: A New Offense, A Separate 
Punishment 
The most prominent assertion made by the Sixth Circuit in its 
opinion in United States v. Reese was that a defendant who has vio­
lated a condition of supervised release has committed a new offense 
and, as a result, receives a new sentence attributable to this most 
recent conduct.179 A key fact relied upon by the court regarding 
this point was that imprisonment and supervised release constitute 
separate forms of punishment imposed for a defendant's original 
crime.180 It added that the punishment imposed for a violation of 
supervised release can often result in a cumulative prison sentence 
that exceeds the maximum sentence allowed for the original of­
fense.181 As a result, the court concluded that the sanction imposed 
for a violation of release must be connected to that violation only, 
not to the original crime.l82 
The Sixth Circuit correctly stated that courts impose super­
vised release in addition to imprisonment and that the length of the 
prison term imposed for a violation can exceed that of the maxi­
mum term allowed for the original offense.183 However, the court 
concluded that because defendants, upon violating the terms of 
178. 	 See id. at 590. 
179. 	 See id. at 587-88. 
180. 	 See id. at 587. 
181. 	 See id. at 588. 
182. 	 See id. 
183. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of 
supervised release in sentencing. 
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their release, could receive more total prison time than that which 
could have been imposed for their original crimes, the additional 
prison time had to be linked to a new offense-the violation of re­
lease.184 This conclusion conflicts with the nature of the supervised 
release as described in the legislative history, as articulated by stat­
ute, and also with the views of the Sentencing Commission, all of 
which suggest that supervised release violations are not to be con­
sidered new substantive offenses for purposes of ex post facto 
analysis. 
Although certainly not conclusive, the legislative history of the 
supervised release system indicates that the Sixth Circuit's charac­
terization of supervised release violations placed much more signifi­
cance on the conduct constituting the violation than was ever 
intended. When initially outlining what was to become the new sys­
tem of supervised release, the Senate Judiciary Committee used the 
term "contempt" to describe the status of a defendant who had vio­
lated release.1ss In fact, originally, the Committee did not intend to 
establish revocation proceedings for supervised release violations 
because it believed that "a minor violation of a condition of super­
vised release should [not] result in resentencing of the defendant 
and because ... a more serious violation should be dealt willi as a 
new offense."186 Instead, courts were to respond to such violations 
by modifying the conditions of release.187 Apparently, when Con­
gress developed the supervised release system, it did not intend for 
the modification of conditions, what it considered to be the appro­
priate "punishment" for supervised release violations, to be 
deemed a new sentence-separate and distinct from the one origi­
nally imposed. To the contrary, violations of release were intended 
to bring about a restructuring of the conditions that were estab­
lished as part of the defendant's original sentence. Thus, in order to 
attach the punishment imposed under the new provision to the con­
duct occurring after the enactment of that provision, the Sixth Cir­
cuit in Reese had to substantially amplify the significance of the 
conduct constituting the violation. 
The language used by Congress in the statute authorizing the 
imposition of supervised release also suggests that the term of im­
prisonment imposed for the original crime, combined with the term 
184. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 588. 
185. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3308. 
186. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308. 
187. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308. 
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of release, constitutes a single product of the same "event"-the 
sentencing court's scrutiny of the original crime.188 Because the 
statute allows the sentencing court to include a term of release "as 
part of the sentence" for the original crime, it requires the sentenc­
ing court to consider many of the same factors that it must also 
weigh in determining sentences for crimes in general.189 This lan­
guage indicates that when a defendant receives a sentence for a 
crime, consisting of a term of imprisonment to be followed by a 
term of supervised release, the sentencing court has concluded that 
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's commission of that 
crime has created a need for additional punishment-the term of 
release. Just as the term of release represents a component of the 
defendant's original sentence, so too does the possibility of reim­
prisonment for violating a condition of that release. Stated differ­
ently, the rules and conditions of supervised release, as well as the 
attached punishments, flow directly from the sentencing court's de­
termination of the original sentence.1OO Reimprisonment for violat­
ing release does serve as an enhanced punishment, in a sense, but 
for the original crime. Consequently, any alteration of the provi­
sions governing the imposition of this punishment, after a defend­
ant has been sentenced for his original crime, has the direct effect of 
altering the defendant's original sentence. 
The Sentencing Commission's view further supports the idea 
that supervised release violations are not to be considered new sub­
stantive offenses for ex post facto purposes.191 The Commission, 
188. In 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994), Congress states that "[t]he court, in imposing 
a sentence to a tenn of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as part 
of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a tenn of supervised 
release after imprisonment ....tt Id. (emphasis added). 
189. See id. § 3583(c) (requiring the court, in detennining whether to include a 
tenn of supervised release, to consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a». See supra 
note 38 (discussing these factors). 
190. Congress stated that a principal reason for developing the supervised release 
system was to enable sentencing courts to meet the needs of individual defendants. See 
S. REp. No. 98-225, at 124 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307. Accordingly, 
courts have been given the authority to consider the circumstances surrounding the 
original crime in detennining the need for a supervised release tenn. See id., reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3307; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (providing the factors to be 
considered in including a tenn of supervised release). It is difficult to reconcile this 
intent with the Sixth Circuit's assertion that supervised release, and its accompanying 
provisions, are not connected to the original sentence for ex post facto purposes. 
191. The Sentencing Commission's view was first cited by the United States Dis­
trict Court for the Western District of Kentucky in United States V. Flora, 810 F. Supp. 
841,843 (W.O. Ky. 1993). See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Flora. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
534 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:499 
after deliberation, concluded that a violation of release should be 
considered a "breach of trust. "192 The punishment for the breach 
would be imposed by courts only to sanction the defendant for fail­
ing to abide by the release conditions, not to provide punishment 
for any new criminal conduct.193 Punishment for new criminal con­
duct constituting a violation of release would be left to the court 
having jurisdiction over that offense.194 
Indeed, the Commission expressly rejected the view that sanc­
tions imposed for supervised release violations and punishment for 
the new offenses be determined simultaneously.195 Following the 
approach selected by the Commission, a defendant's violation of 
release constitutes a breach of the terms of a trust relationship-a 
relationship established at the time the defendant's original sen­
tence is determined and imposed. Accordingly, the violation of re­
lease, standing on its own as a "breach of trust," does not serve as 
the basis for a new criminal punishment, as the Sixth Circuit asserts 
in Reese. Conversely, the violation of release, rather than giving 
rise to new criminal sanctions, serves as a triggering mechanism for 
a punishment previously established as part of the sentence for the 
original crime. 
B. 	 Supervised Release Violation Statutes as Repeat Offender 
Laws 
The Sixth Circuit did not find it necessary to examine the in­
tent of Congress or the views of the Sentencing Commission. In­
stead, the court invoked an argument that had previously been 
rejected by other courts.196 The court concluded that the imposi~ 
cited the reasoning of Flora in United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993). 
See supra notes 115-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paskow. 
192. 	 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL, ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). See supra Part 
I.B.2 for a discussion of the Sentencing Commission's decision to treat violations of 
supervised release as a "breach of trust." In Flora, the district court stated that "[t]he 
Guidelines therefore suggest that the parolee's misconduct might result not only in rev­
ocation of release but also in a subsequent, independent criminal prosecution." Flora, 
810 F. Supp. at 843. 
193. 	 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). 
194. 	 See id. 
195. See id. The Commission's principal reason for rejecting this view was its fear 
that this practice would lead to duplicated efforts among the different courts whereby 
the punishment for the violation would have often been subsumed in the sentence im­
posed for the new conduct itself. See id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the reasons the Commission offered for reaching this decision. 
196. See, e.g., United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
the argument that an "amended statute [did] not increase the penalty for a prior crime, 
but rather enhance[d] the penalty for the revocation behavior"); Fender v. Thompson, 
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tion of additional prison time for violations of release mirrored the 
imposition of more severe punishments under repeat offender 
laws.197 According to the court, in both situations, harsher penal­
ties are imposed for a defendant's most recent conduct. This asser­
tion stretches the repeat offender analogy too far. 
In comparing the supervised release violation statutes to repeat 
offender laws, the Sixth Circuit conveyed the notion that a defend­
ant who has yet to be convicted of any crime -may be sentenced for 
a violation as if already deemed guilty of an offense.198 However, a 
ffuding that a defendant has violated conditions of supervised re­
lease is not necessarily a finding that that defendant has committed 
a new crime.199 Alleged violators of release are not afforded full 
criminal proceedings.2°O Violation hearings are designed only to 
determine whether a defendant has violated the terms of release by 
a preponderance of the evidence. These proceedings do not estab­
lish a defendant's guilt in connection with a new crime. They only 
serve to establish that a defendant has violated the terms of release 
and therefore requires sanctioning for that violation.201 . 
.On the other hand, repeat offender laws, upon which the Sixth 
Circuit heavily relies, impose enhanced punishments for repetitive 
criminal conduct.202 Under these laws, defendants are convicted of 
883 F.2d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Schwartz v. Muncy, 834 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 
1987) (rejecting the argument that an amended parole statute imposed enhanced pun­
ishments in the same manner as recidivist statutes); see also United States v. Beals, 87 
F.3d 854, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the recidivist statute argument asserted by 
the Sixth Circuit in Reese). 
197. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 1995), cen. denied, 116 
S. a. 2529 (1996). See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of repeat offender statutes. 
. 198. The Sixth Circuit asserted that violators of supervised release receive en­
hanced punishments for their most recent conduct. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. Again, it 
is difficult to reconcile this view with the fact that supervised release violations are not 
"crimes." By deeming supervised release violations as independent, punishable of­
fenses, the Sixth Circuit suggests that criminal penalties may· be imposed for conduct 
not constituting a crime. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the procedural setting of supervised release violation proceedings. 
199. In fact, the conduct constituting a violation of release is often not criminal in 
and of itself. For example, violations of release can include failing to support depen­
dents or failing to maintain suitable employment. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859-60. See 
supra notes 48-53,146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of super­
vised release violation proceedingS. 
200. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
nature of supervised release violation proceedings. 
201. See supra notes 48-53, 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
nature of supervised release viol.ation proCeedings. 
202. The Seventh Circuit in Beals emphasized this point. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 
859. The court in Beals stated that "[t]he increased punishment imposed under a recidi­
vist statute is triggered by subsequent conduct that is itself a crime. The government 
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wholly new crimes and are given enhanced sentences in light of 
their history of criminal behavior. Courts have not found ex post 
facto violations in the repeat offender cases because the enhanced 
punishment is seen as a statutorily authorized punishment for 
crimes committed after the date of the statute's enactment.203 As 
the Supreme Court in Gryger v. Burke stated, the enhanced sen­
tence "is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered 
to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."204 The Sixth 
Circuit's comparison of the statutes governing supervised release 
violations to repeat offender laws ignores the absence of a new, for­
mally established crime. This analogy is flawed because it suggests 
that supervised release violators may be subjected to new criminal 
punishment, like repeat offenders, when in fact no new crime has 
been established through the procedurally relaxed violation 
proceedings. 
The Reese court defended its position against this procedural 
protection argument by raising two points. First, the court gener­
ally dismissed the argument by stating that "[n]o previous ex post 
facto cases have focused on the nature of the procedural protec­
tions afforded in hearings or trials on subsequent violations."20S 
Second, the court cited to cases involving provisions that were en­
acted, and subsequently altered, in administrative settings-specifi­
cally prison regulations.206 The court asserted that like supervised 
release violation proceedings, the proceedings addressing alleged 
violations of prison regulations have also been governed by simi­
larly relaxed procedural protection.207 The Sixth Circuit stated that 
courts have not found ex post facto violations in these cases where 
the altered prison regulations were applied to inmates imprisoned 
punishes that conduct because of its nature, not because of the defendant's original 
offense." Id. It continued, stating that "[c]onduct that violates the tenns of supervised 
release ... is often not criminal." Id. The court then dismissed the repeat offender 
analogy, reasoning that "the government punishes [those violations of release] only be­
cause of the defendant's original offense. For that reason, we must link the punishment 
imposed for the subsequent conduct to the original offense for ex post [acto purposes." 
Id. at 860 (emphasis added). See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of Beals; see also supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of repeat offender statutes. 
203. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 7'lf!. (1948); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 
51 (1914); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). 
204. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added). 
205. United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 2529 (1996). 
206. See id. at 590. 
207. See id. (citing Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995), and Ewell v. 
Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 485 (4th Cir. 1993». 
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before the alterations.208 A careful review of these cases highlights 
some important distinctions between administrative provisions, 
such as prison regulations, and the statutory provisions governing 
supervised release violations. 
The prison regulation cases, in not finding an ex post facto vio­
lation, relied heavily on the particular nature of the prison regula­
tions.209 The courts stated that prison regulations have been 
classified as "administrative" provisions rather than penal.210 In 
other words, these regulations were not designed to impose punish­
ment, but rather to facilitate the achievement of a policy goal.211 
Therefore, as "reasonable" prison regulations, the courts found that 
these regulations could be applied to all inmates, regardless of 
when the inmate entered prison.212 Additionally, the courts have 
stated that the prisoners' ex post facto claims were without merit 
because the alteration of prison regulations could reasonably have 
been anticipated, at the time of sentencing, by every prisoner as a 
necessary function of prison management.213 
These distinctions diminish the strength of the Sixth Circuit's 
use of the prison regulation cases as a defense to the procedural 
protection argument. Although these cases appear to refute the 
procedural protection argument posed by the other courts of ap­
peals in response to the repeat offender analogy, the nature of 
prison regulations and the function they serve in the prison environ­
ment does not coincide with the system of supervised release. The 
supervised release statutes are not designed for an administrative 
environment.214 They are also not driven by policy goals (i.e. the 
208. See iii. 
209. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86. 
210. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86. 
211. A general policy goal has been defined as achieving "good prison adminis­
tration, safety and efficiency." Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,309 (4th Cir. 1992). Em­
phasizing the importance of allowing prison administrators to adopt new regulations in 
order to effectuate this policy goal, the court in Jones added that the adoption of such 
regulations is "contemplated as part of the sentence of every prisoner ... [and subse­
quent punishment for infractions does] not constitute additional punishment ...." Id. 
212. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 486. 
213. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239 (citing Jones, 962 F.2d at 309). See also Ewell, 11 
F.3d at 487 ("[T]he prison regulation ordering inmate compliance with an administra­
tive regulation is reasonably within the administrative structure of prison authority that 
attends every sentence."). 
214. The prison regulations in the aforementioned cases were specifically 
designed to attain various policy goals. For example, in Gilbert, the requirement of a 
blood sample was designed "for the sole purpose of establishing a data bank which 
[would] aid future law enforcement." Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 239 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 
309). Such policy goals are absent from the supervised release statutes. Conversely, 
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collection of blood samples for law enforcement purposes).21S· Con­
versely, these statutes penalize defendants for violating the condi­
tions of their release. Accordingly, unlike changes in prison 
regulations, the alteration of the statutory provisions governing su­
pervised release cannot be included under the umbrella of "reason­
ably anticipated administrative functions" as the Sixth Circuit 
necessarily did. The supervised, release statutes serve to impose 
penalties for violations of mandatory conditions of release. Conse­
quently, without support for its assertion that the lack of procedural 
protection afforded defendants in supervised release violation pro­
ceedings is insignificant for ex post facto purposes, it is difficult to 
find merit in the Sixth Circuit's repeat offender analogy. 
C. 	 The New Statutory Provisipns Are Only Applicable to 
Defendants Who Commit a Subsequent Offense 
The Sixth Circuit in Ree~e attempted to clarify its position, at 
more than one point in its opinion, by stating that the new "disad­
vantage" imposed under the amended statutory provision did not 
apply to everyone who had committed the same underlying offense 
as the defendant. The new provision only applied to those defend­
ants who committed some subsequent offense, after the amendment 
had gone into effect.216 As stated by the court, "[a] person on su­
pervised release, situated identically to [the defendant] ... would 
have suffered no ill consequences from the passage of the new law 
...."217 The court claimed that it would be illogical to "argue[] 
that the punishment is being imposed 'because of' the earlier con­
duct."218 This argument essentially maintains that if the defendant 
in Reese did not continue to test positive for drug use while on su­
pervised release, he would have been unaffected by the new statu­
tory provision. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that when 
the terms of the new provision were imposed, they were imposed 
these statutes are designed to sanction individuals for violating the tenns of their re­
lease. See supra Part I.B.l for a discussion of the statutory provisions governing super­
vised release violations. 
215. This was the policy goal behind the regulations at issue in Gilbert, Ewell and 
Jones. See Gilbert, 55 F.3d at 238-39; Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485-86; Jones, 962 F.2d at 309-10. 
216. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 588-91 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996). 
217. 	 Id. at 590. 
218. Id. In support of its argument, the Sixth Circuit noted that the most promi­
nent Supreme Court ex post facto cases, those in which ex post facto violations had 
been found, "involve[d] increases in punishment that appl[ied] to all prisoners, regard
less of later conduct." Id. (emphasis added). 
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only for the defendant's most recent conduct-the violation of re­
lease, or the conduct occurring after the enactment of the new 
provision.219 
The court in Reese is correct in stating that all similarly situated 
defendants were affected in the same manner by the enactment of 
the new supervised release statutory provisions, and that the de­
fendant in its case was not subjected to the new provision until he 
violated release. Nonetheless, this does little to advance the Sixth 
Circuit's position, primarily in light of the Supreme Court's affirma­
tion of Greenfield v. Scafati.220 
In Greenfield, Massachusetts altered its good-time credit sys­
tem so that any inmate violating parole would be precluded from 
accumulating good-conduct credit upon returning to prison. The 
amendment affected every prisoner who had been sentenced before 
the amendment equally.221 Stated differently, if every prisoner in 
the defendant's position had refrained from violating parole, the 
new provision would have had no effect on their accumulation of 
good-time credits.222 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court's conclusion that the application of the new statute to 
inmates imprisoned before its enactment violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.223 The district court had justified its holding by stating that 
the new statute prevented these inmates from being released as 
early as they might have been under the previous version of the 
statute. The district court reached its conclusion despite the fact 
that the new provision was triggered by conduct occurring after its 
enactment.224 The statutory provisions at issue in the supervised 
release violation cases operated in the same manner as the provi­
219. See id. 
220. 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), affd mem., 390 U.S. 
713 (1968). . 
221. See Greenfield, 277 F. Supp. at 645. The amendment did not apply to those 
persons who were already on parole when the amendment went into effect. See id. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. at 646. 
224. See id. at 645-46. See also Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(prohibiting the retroactive application of a new statute enhancing the penalty for pa­
role violations despite the fact that the defendant was on notice of the new provision); 
Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting the retroactive applica­
tion of a new parole eligibility statute enacted after the defendant's original crime but 
before the parole violation); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) 
(per curiam) (holding that the application of a new statute providing for the forfeiture 
of good-time credits upon revocation of parole, enacted after the defendant's conviction 
but before his parole, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the forfeiture extended 
the time remaining to be served on the defendant's original sentence). 
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sion at issue in Greenfield. The new provision at issue in Reese was 
enacted after the commission of the defendant's original offense, 
but before the violations of release. Nonetheless, when applied, it 
had the effect of imposing a longer sentence on an individual who, 
quite possibly, would have received a much shorter term of impris­
onment under the version of the statute in place at the time his 
original crime was committed. In other words, like the altered 
good-time provisions in the parole cases, the new provision gov­
erning supervised release extends the time remaining on the de­
fendant's original sentence. Whether the change takes place before 
or after the violation of release, the new provisions retroactively 
alter the punishment for the original offense. The Sixth Circuit 
failed to consider this point. 
The Sixth Circuit did not place any significance on the Green­
field line of cases because, in the court's opinion, supervised release 
is an inherently different system than both parole and probation.225 
In making these distinctions, and thereby refusing to adhere to the 
reasoning of Greenfield, the Sixth Circuit chose not to follow rather 
convincing precedent.226 The majority of courts of appeals, rather 
than comparing supervised release statutes to repeat offender laws, 
reasoned that supervised release revocation is equivalent to parole 
revocation for ex post facto purposes.227 This view offers a sound 
characterization of the supervised release system. 
Under the parole system, the statutes in place at the time of 
sentencing set forth the manner in which a defendant would earn 
the right to serve a portion of that sentence outside of prison.228 In 
addition, these statutes determined what would have happened had 
the defendant violated any of the parole conditions. Similarly, 
under the supervised release system, the statutes in place at the 
time of sentencing establish, or dictate how a court is to establish, 
the terms and conditions of release.229 These provisions also set 
forth the punishments for release violations.230 In other words, like 
the terms governing a prisoner's eligibility for parole, the conditions 
225. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 2529 (1996) ("There is an inherent difference between probation and supervised 
release."). See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth 
Circuit's comparison of supervised release to parole and probation. 
226. See supra Parts 1.0.1 and II.A for a discussion of cases following the reason­
ing of Greenfield. 
227. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these cases. 
228. See supra note 32 for a brief discussion of the parole system. 
229. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994). 
230. See ill. 
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attached to a defendant's term of supervised release are imposed as 
part of the defendant's original sentence.231 For this reason, the 
majority of courts of appeals have accurately compared supervised 
release to parole for purposes of ex post facto analysis and followed 
the reasoning used in the Greenfield line of cases.232 
As previously stated, the Sixth Circuit in Reese attempted to 
distinguish the two systems by asserting that, as opposed to terms of 
imprisonment following parole revocation, terms of imprisonment 
following supervised release revocation can exceed the maximum 
allowed for the original offense.233 Again, this argument ignores 
the connection between supervised release and the original sen-· 
tence.234 It also places great weight on a distinction that has little 
bearing on the ex post facto issue. The majority of courts of ap­
peals adhered to the nature of the supervised release system as for­
mulated by Congress and the Sentencing Commission.235 These 
courts focused on the function of supervised release as a component 
of a defendant's original sentence. Accordingly, the Seventh Cir­
cuit in United States v. Beals placed this issue in the proper perspec­
tive.236 In addressing the differences between parole and 
supervised release, it concluded that "[the] distinction[s] [are] 
meaningless for purposes of ex post facto analysis. Under both sys­
tems, a defendant is sentenced for an original offense to a combina­
tion of imprisonment and post-imprisonment release."237 
231. Several courts of appeals have applied this reasoning. See, e.g., United 
States v. Beals, 'if1 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 'if13 (9th Cir. 1993). 
232. Additionally, given the similarities between supervised release revocation 
and probation revocation, the comparison of supervised release to parole is further sup­
ported by the Supreme Court's view that despite the "undoubted minor differences" 
between the two systems, there is no constitutional difference between revocation of 
probation and parole revocation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973). See 
supra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervised release and proba­
tion. Although the Court's assertion in Gagnon was made in the context of due process 
analysis, it indicates that the differences between supervised release and parole, at least 
for ex post facto purposes, are not as great as the Sixth Circuit in Reese suggests. See 
United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Gagnon in a compari­
son of supervised release, probation and parole). 
233. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 5'if1-BB (6th Cir. 1995), cen. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996). 
234. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the connection between supervised 
release and a defendant's original sentence. 
235. See supra Parts I.A-B for a discussion of the development and characteris­
tics of the supervised release system. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of courts 
which relied on this background in reaching their decisions. 
236. See Beals, 'if1 F.3d at 859-60. 
237. Id. at 860. 
542 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:499 
CONCLUSION 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 led to the development of 
the supervised release system in an effort to replace the much criti­
cized parole system that produced unfair and inconsistent sentenc­
ing. Congress justified supervised release as a method of tailoring 
sentences to the needs of individual defendants based on the nature 
of the crime committed as well as the characteristics of the particu­
lar defendant. The statutes and guidelines in place at the time of 
sentencing were designed to dictate the administration of super­
vised release, including the conditions of the term as well as the 
penalties attached to subsequent violations. The modification of 
these statutes resulted in a split among the federal courts of appeals 
concerning the question of whether the application of the amended 
statutes to defendants sentenced before the amendments gives rise 
to an ex post facto violation. 
Contrary to the weight of precedent, the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Reese did not find an ex post facto violation, primarily be­
cause that court viewed the punishment for supervised release vio­
lations as constituting a separate punishment from the one imposed 
for the original crime. Accordingly, the court did not see a retroac­
tive application of an altered law. The remaining circuits deciding 
the issue, however, reached the opposite conclusion. These courts 
held that sanctions imposed for supervised release violations were 
inherently part of the original sentence, and that any altered ver­
sion of those sanctions could not be applied to defendants who had 
committed their crimes before the alteration was made, at least 
where the alteration had the effect of increasing the defendant's 
punishment. The latter view appears to be more consistent with the 
nature of the supervised release system. 
As indicated by Congress and the Sentencing Commission, su­
pervised release is a form of punishment given in addition to a term 
of imprisonment as part of a defendant's sentence for a crime. 
While it is a separate form of punishment, it is very much a part of 
that original sentence. The conditions of supervised release are im­
posed at the time of sentencing, as are the penalties attached to 
violations of those conditions. Additionally, violations are not 
crimes in and of themselves. They are acts deemed punishable 
under the supervised release provisions only because the defendant 
committed the original offense. In these respects, supervised re­
lease is essentially equivalent to parole, a system in which courts 
have viewed the application of amended statutes to defendants who 
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committed their crimes before the amendments to violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. These courts held that restricting a defendant's 
eligibility for parole essentially alters the punishment for the de­
fendant's original crime. The cases involving supervised release 
statutes are analogous. The supervised release cases involve the 
same retroactive application of amended statutory provisions, pro­
visions which, in their previous -forms, established the foundation of 
the defendant's original sentence. This is the very practice that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution was written to prohibit. 
Ryan M. Zenga 
